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Abstract 
Interim reports are summary statements that are usually prepared in semi-annual format in the UK. Until the 
EU’s Transparency Directive was put into practice in the UK in 2007, there was no legal necessity for 
companies to provide interim financial reports. (Note 1) Instead such preparation was only a regulatory 
requirement of the London Stock Exchange. The responsibility on companies listed on the London Stock 
Exchange to provide these financial reports was first prepared as an suggestion in 1964, to meet the 
requirements for updates by financial analysts (May, 1971). In 1973, this advice to provide the market with 
interim information became a requirement for the admission of stocks and securities to be listed on the stock 
Exchange (Lunt, 1982). This study investigates the preparation of interim reports, and accounting standards for 
interim reporting. Also, this study discusses the main purpose of interim reports, the methods of preparation and 
the benefits of reporting frequency. 
Keywords: interim report, interim information, reporting frequency 
1. Interim Reports and Accounting Standards 
In the UK, the first regulation on this topic from the regulator was Interim Reports (Accounting Standards Board, 
1997). More recently, these guidelines have been replaced by a new statement entitled Half-yearly Financial 
Reports (Accounting Standards Board, 2007). For listed companies, however, the Financial Service Authority, 
applying the Transparency Directive, necessitates these companies to apply IAS 34, Interim Financial Reporting 
(International Accounting Standards Board, 1998, 2010). According to Deloitte (2010), the impact of IAS 34 is 
as follows (Note 2): 
“IAS 34 ‘Interim Financial Reporting’ prescribes the minimum content of an interim financial report. It outlines 
the recognition and measurement principles which are to be followed in interim financial statements.” 
Another feature of interim financial reports value highlighting at this stage is that they are not audited, which 
might be considered to influence their reliability for investment decision-making, although both Firth (1981) and 
Opong (1995) show that the UK market, as with the US market, comes into view to incorporate interim 
information into prices relatively quickly. Opong finds interim financial reports include information that is price 
sensitive and the effect of the related information happens on the day such statements are published. 
Professional parameters for the preparation of interim reports have been in place in the USA since the 1970s, in 
the form of APB Opinion No. 28, Interim Financial Reporting (Accounting Principles Board, 1973). It is worth 
noting here that, whereas interim reports in the UK are provided half-yearly, this is dissimilar to the situation in 
the US where they are provided on a quarterly basis as required legally by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission. In fact, the SEC’s founding agreement in 1934 gave it authority to necessitate financial interim 
reports, however, in the face of substantial opposition, although the requirement was first introduced in 1946, it 
was dropped in 1952, and then reintroduced over again in 1970 (Yee, 2004). Through the FASB, accounting 
standards in this respect were first developed as SFAS No. 3 Reporting Accounting Changes in Interim 
Financial Statements (Financial Accounting Standards Board, 1974) and further as SFAS No. 18 Financial 
Reporting for Segments of a Business Enterprise: Interim Financial Statements (Financial Accounting Standards 
Board, 1977). Under the authoritarian framework now in force in the USA, it is Regulation S-X and subsequent 
Financial Reporting Releases that set out the official requirements for interim financial statements as wanted 
under the securities legislation, with regular modifications between 1981 and 2011. (Note 3) 
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In the UK, when the ASB first issued Interim Reports (Accounting Standards Board, 1997), the intention was to 
have influential power over best practice rather than mandatory force (it was not published correctly as an 
accounting standard because interim reporting was not required under the Companies Act). The ASB’s 1997 
statement suggested that interim financial reports should be drawn up by applying the similar principles and 
practices used for annual reporting, and that such statements should contain a narrative commentary and a 
summarised income, balance sheet and the cash flow statements, together with details of outstanding items, 
achievements and discontinued operations, and relative figures both for the matching interim financial period 
and for the previous full financial year.  
In July 2007, the 1997 statement was re-titled Half-yearly Reports, having been updated and revised as a result 
of new disclosure and transparency regulations. It should be noted, however, this paper is concerned only with 
UK listed companies, and their interim reporting is now required to be in agreement with IFRS. (Note 4) The 
progress of an international standard started with disclosure draft E57 in 1997, leading to the publication of IAS 
34 Interim Financial Reporting (International Accounting Standards Board, 1998), which became effective on 1 
July 1999. A related IASB interpretation has been published since then, the IFRIC 10 Interim Financial 
Reporting and Impairment (Note 5) (International Accounting Standards Board, 2006), which became valuable 
for annual periods starting on or after November 1st 2006. Also, there have been two significant adjustments to 
IAS 34, one arising from the revision of IAS 1 in 2007, and the other arising from the Annual Improvements 
Programme in 2010. (Note 6) 
Whilst IAS 34 identifies the content of an interim financial report conforming to International Financial 
Reporting Standards, it does not mandate which firms should issue interim financial statements, nor how 
regularly. The IASB leaves such substances up to stock exchanges, national governments, securities regulators 
and/or accounting standard setters. However, the Standard encourages interim financial reports, as a minimum 
for the first half of the fiscal year, to be made obtainable not later than 60 days and after the end of the interim 
period. (Note 7) 
IAS 34 requires that the similar accounting policies should be used for interim reporting as are used in the firm’s 
yearly reports. An example is for accounting policy modifies prepared after the time of the latest yearly financial 
reports that are to be replicated in the subsequent yearly financial reports (IAS 34.28). The important point is 
that a firm should use the similar accounting method during a financial year. If a result is made to change an 
accounting method mid-year, the change is employed all together, and until that time reported interim data is 
restated (IAS 34.43). 
For interim reports purposes, the measurements should be prepared on a year-to-date basis therefore the 
frequency of the firm’s reporting does not influence the measurement of its yearly outputs. The following 
thoughts are made explicit in this respect: 
 Receiving revenues as seasonally in a financial period should not be predicted or postponed as of the 
interim date, if expectation or postponement would not be suitable at the year-end date(IAS 34.37); 
 Expenditures that are incurred unequally through a financial year should be approximated or postponed for 
interim financial reporting reasons if it is suitable to estimate or postpone that kind of cost at the end of the 
full financial year (IAS 34.39); 
 The expenses such as Tax should be distinguished according to the top estimate of the weighted average 
yearly effective rate of income tax which is anticipated for the financial year (IAS 34.B12). (Note 8) 
 If the companies’ trade is extremely seasonal, IAS 34 promotes to disclose the financial information for the 
most recent twelve months, and preparing comparable information for the previous twelve-month (IAS 
34.21). 
Although there is no officially requirement for auditors to reassess semi-annually reports before they are issued, 
managers can arrange for a review to be carried out as a separate commitment. Previously, the Auditing 
Practices Board Bulletin Review of Interim Financial Information (Auditing Practices Board Bulletin, 1999) set 
out direction for auditors on the processes to be undertaken when semi-annually reports re-examine. For 
accounting periods ending on or after 20th September 2007, this is superseded by APB’s adoption of the 
International Standard on Review Engagements (UK and Ireland) No. 2410, Review of Interim Financial 
Information Performed by the Independent Auditor of the Entity (Auditing Practices Board, 2007). This takes 
account of the changes to the detailed prerequisites on the issuing of the semi-annually reports by the UK listed 
firms for that reason of the EC Transparency Directive. Where the auditor’s effort is done in harmony with the 
ABP regulation, the auditor’s re-examine report should be issued in the semi-annually report. If the auditor 
carried out a range of the work less than that set out in the APB regulation, the managers should explain the 
information of the financial events in semi-annually report as ‘neither audited nor reviewed’. 
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The S-X Regulations in the USA also allow interim reports to be unaudited. It is worth noting here that they 
may be extremely condensed financial reports. For example, under SEC rules, interim income and balance 
sheets statements only need to include main captions (where data on components of inventories; finished goods, 
raw materials and work in process must be included either on the face of the balance sheet or in the notes to the 
financial statements). Where any main balance sheet statement caption is fewer than 10% of total assets and the 
total amount has not raised or declined by more than 25% given that the end of the previous financial year, the 
caption may be merged with the others.  
Similarly, when any major profit and loss statement caption is fewer than 15% of average net income for the 
latest three financial years and the quantity has not increased or decreased about more than 20% as evaluated to 
the equivalent prior interim period, the caption may again be merged with others.  
The cash flows statement may also be shortened, beginning with a form of net cash flows that comes from 
operating performance and changes in cash that rises from investing and financing activities when they become 
more than 10% of the average of net cash flows from operating activities for the latest three years.  
These detailed regulations in the US demonstrate how firms can provide highly aggregated data in their interim 
financial statements, which, together with audit considerations, have given rise to a number of important 
research studies investigating the quality of interim financial statements, which is the background to the present 
study.  
Brown and Pinello (2007) examine the usefulness of the financial reporting technique at restraining earnings 
surprise games. They argue that the yearly reporting procedure is subject to an independent audit while the 
interim reporting process is not. Also the annual reporting process has more precise expense recognition rules 
than the interim reporting procedure. It follows that annual reporting gives managers fewer opportunities to lead 
earnings upward. They argue that yearly reporting decreases the possibility of income-increasing in earnings by 
managers. However it increases the level of downward expectations for managers. Their results show that 
regulatory attempts to show corporations’ internal checks and balances are probable to be more effective at 
restricting upward earnings management than at justifying negative surprise avoidance. (Note 9) The Brown and 
Pinello results shows that annual reports, unlike interim reports, are areas under discussion to independent audits 
and more inflexible expense detection rules. According to the interim financial reporting process, they 
demonstrate the annual reporting process decreases managers’ tendency to manage earnings upward. Also, their 
findings show that managers bring into play downward expectations of management as an option method to 
make surprise earnings games when their capability to manage earnings upward is restricted. 
Mangena and Tauringana (2007) examine the effectiveness of agency that related to the mechanisms on the 
level of disclosure compliance of interim reports with the ASB Statement. They show that in general disclosure 
compliance is not high and firms do not fully conform to the ASB Statement on interim financial reports. They 
use least square (OLS) as an ordinary model of regression to provide whether selected firm-specific and 
corporate governance qualities relate to the disclosure compliance degree. Their findings show that company 
range, multiple listing, dividend of interim period and new share issuance has a positive association with the 
degree of compliance. Furthermore, their result shows that the level of disclosure compliance is positively 
related with auditor participation, audit committee financial expertise and audit committee independence. 
2. Discussion  
According to Yee (2004), the quality of interim financial reports in the US, may suffer from the fact that, 
without final audit, material transactions such as business arrangements, restructuring provisions, major 
contracts and proceedings, may not be allocated accurately to the accounting period. This could emerge in the 
final period modifications when more focused audit procedures are performed on those events and transactions. 
Such modifications can cast suspicion on the integrity of the interim financial reporting, and cast a shadow over 
the reliability of interim financial statements. Furthermore, seasonality factors may create more volatile interim 
financial results, with revenues and costs in one particular period being shown as applicable to another period, 
and with uncertainties arising about costs that are not known until the end of the fiscal year. These issues may 
appear to be more sensitive under quarterly reporting in the USA, but it is notable that similar concerns are also 
increased with respect to semi-annual reporting, both in the UK (Opong, 1995; Mangena & Pike, 2004; 
Mangena & Tauringana, 2007) and more widely in the EU (Schiller & Vegt, 2010).  
Schiller and Vegt (2010) investigate the effect of interim financial reporting on the quality of accounting. They 
argued that management’s preferred objective is a high stock price. They argue that managers in each sub-period 
may bias accounting reports Also, Schiller and Vegt argued that the enforcement structure ties sanctions to the 
detected gap between reported accounting earnings and net cash flows from firm activities at the liquidation 
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stage. They argued that there are many a circumstance in which interim reporting does not improve accounting 
features. Their result indicated that biased reports in the short term stay on with lower incremental sanctions at 
each reporting period. They tried to find another clarification for the low accounting quality of interim financial 
reports. They tried to look at the strategic communication between investors and managers. 
Schiller and Vegt show that interim reporting can improve the quality of accounting if there is stability with 
earnings-inflating financial reports and if the management favourite for having a high stock price is adequately 
low relation to the sanctions for distinguished misreporting. Also, they believe the reverse effects on accounting 
have a tendency to occur if these favourites are sufficiently high relation to the sanctions. They show biased 
interim reporting can even lead to trouble if the manager has no short-term favourite to get a high stock price. 
The finding has implications for discussion of management compensation. To protect reputations, managers will 
bias earnings in the short term even if there is no short-term motivation to do. 
Yee (2004) presents four reasons in favour of interim reporting. First, he believes that improving the timeliness 
of disclosure helps investors to control and monitor the performance of managers and consequently reduces 
agency frictions. Second, if news can be incorporated more repeatedly in prices, this improves the capital 
allocation efficiency. Third, distribution news across interim earnings announcements shrinks information 
asymmetry between sophisticated and less sophisticated traders and users, which may improve market liquidity 
on the date of earnings announcement. Fourth, Interim financial reporting may reduce the interim information 
asymmetry between internal users and the public or external users, more frequent interim financial reporting 
may decrease the usefulness of rent-seeking efforts by analysts trying to get information that is not disclosed 
More specifically, by providing a suggestion of how the firm is improving during the annual reporting period, 
interim reports can aid financial analysts in predicting, at a minimum, the possible outcome for the year with 
respect to the variables of interest to them. That is, in providing an update on firms’ activities to financial 
analysts in this way; interim reporting is capable of contributing to a reduction in insider trading by setting into 
the public domain timely information which would otherwise be confidentially held until the year end (Opong, 
1995). 
Mensah and Werner (2008) examined the extent to which the frequency of interim financial reporting may affect 
share price volatility in financial market over the course of the year. They examination focuses on different 
interim reporting regimes in four different countries: Canada and the United States with quarterly reporting, and 
Australia and the UK with half-yearly interim financial reporting. They argue in the trade-off between predictive 
value and timeliness of the interim reports, half-yearly interim financial reporting will guide to lower price 
volatility. These expectations are supported in their findings. Furthermore, further tests accomplished on 
American ADRs of Australian and British companies demonstrate that such firms have upper volatilities than 
similar domestic companies on their home stock exchanges. 
Mensah and Werner argue that the alternative of interim reporting intervals might be a significant factor in 
obtaining greater competence in the capital markets for two motivations. First, more frequent interim financial 
reports can signal that security values show the most recent company-specific information, leading to more 
competent stock pricing. Secondly, more numerous interim financial reports can force companies to put together 
more estimates. Therefore, more informed estimates are obtainable only with the passing of time. However, the 
more frequent interim financial reports may be subject to more error. Therefore, investors reacting to the more 
frequent interim financial reports may affect bigger volatility in security prices.  
The London Stock Exchange had included with its listing requirements the construction and allocation of 
interim financial statements at half-yearly intervals. In Great Britain accounting regulators formally accepted 
such interim reporting rules only in 1997. The Accounting Standards Board of the UK Statement on Interim 
Reports and their Statement on Preliminary Announcements (published in July 1998) presented voluntary ‘best 
practice’ guidelines aimed to complement the guidelines of the London Stock Exchange. Mensah and Werner’s 
study provide that quarterly reporting highlights capital market volatility in the Canada and United States as 
compared to the capital markets in the UK and Australia. 
An old argument against preparing more regular interim reports relates to the administrative expenses associated 
with compiling and allocating such reports, although by using new technologies, computer and the Internet have 
reduced the force of such arguments. Also, it is still not clear whether mandating more regular interim reports 
actually does increase overall disclosure. According to McNichols and Manegold (1983), interim reporting 
minimally provides information that would otherwise be disclosed in later annual reports. Indeed, Gigler and 
Hemmer (1998) show that mandating more regular interim reporting cause’s managers to decrease their 
voluntary disclosure.  
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According to Butler et al. (2002), in the United States, unlike the UK, there is evidence that the establishment of 
mandatory quarterly reporting did not increase earnings timeliness. The main reason is that quarterly reporting 
replaced appropriate voluntary disclosures by firms beyond the financial statements. This may even have 
undesirable side effects, as Butler et al. claim that forcing managers to report earnings more frequently may 
cause them to make unreasonable judgments, and dropping asymmetry information between competing 
companies throughout increasing the timeliness of disclosure can change the nature of competition in the market 
and may probable misrepresent productivity.  
A further argument is that more frequent reporting may encourage additional information collection activity by 
users and financial analysts, with the increased expenditure on such activities being a social cost. For example, 
when Cuijpers and Peek (2010) examined how quarterly and semi-annual reporting affects investor information, 
they showed that a company’s reporting frequency has no consequence on the precision of that information, on 
average. However, in spite of some of the reservations expressed above, their analysis of price variance in 
announcement periods provides counter-evidence that an increase in reporting frequency can make the 
information of financial reports more significant to users. That is, as investors in semi-annual reporters become 
visible to obtain more pre-announcement information than users in quarterly reporters, it may be construed that 
an increase in a company’s reporting frequency decreases investors and users’ incentives to acquire private 
information between consecutive declaration dates. 
Recently, Doran (2011) shows that interim period earnings performance is related to year-end earnings 
performance. He measures earnings performance as the differences between reported earnings and forecasted 
earnings. He compares interim period and the year-end earnings performance by analysing two groups of firms. 
One of the groups contains firms with only interim future reports included in the earnings forecast; the other 
group includes firms where the forecast concludes at end of the fiscal year. The results show that the end of the 
fiscal year group has relatively critical earnings performance. 
Pahlevan and Ranjbar (2011) examine the factors (company attributes, management and performance) affecting 
the timeliness of interim financial reporting in the listed companies of Malaysia. Their research considers 
transparency as a company’s attributes, capital structure and the agency problem as characteristics of company’s 
management. Also they consider growth, net gain, and profitability in the interim period as a measure of 
company performance. They focus on the Malaysia exchange market and choose the 30 largest and 70 mid-size 
companies that listed in the Malaysia stock exchange in 2007. After exclusion of banks, financial institutes, and 
companies with lack of data, the remaining list includes 72 companies. The fourth quarter of 2007 is considered 
as the basis of interim financial reports. According to their research these companies disclose their reports with 
on average a lag of 54 days. The official deadline for revelation of companies’ quarterly reports is two months, 
therefore it is concluded that companies are inclined to disclose their reports with a delay. 
3. Implications for Research Design 
Dechow et al. (1998) argue that, whilst a shorter earnings measurement interval and a consequent increase in 
observations are the benefits that come from using interim data, short period data makes analytics and empirics 
more complicated by introducing considerable measurement error into the analysis. They also argue that 
seasonality in such data may require the analytics to be modified or the seasonality removed from the data prior 
to testing. The benefits, it seems, are more than offset by the difficulties of modelling and estimating the 
intra-year accounting process. In shorter periods, accruals are largely related to cash flows, which gives rise to 
greater differences in forecasts given the time-series properties of earnings, accruals and operating cash flows. 
In addition, there is evidence that the accrual process may fluctuate between interim reporting periods, i.e. 
quarterly in the US (Collins et al., 1984; Kross & Schroeder, 1990; Salamon & Stober, 1994; Rangan and Sloan, 
1998), and that more temporary earnings items and losses are reported in the fourth quarter (Hayn & Watts, 
1997), consistent with an accounting process that concentrates on an annual horizon.  
According to the GAAP each quarterly reporting period being considered as an integral part of the annual 
financial reporting period is consistent with evidence presented by Rangan and Sloan (1998) concerning the 
auto-regressive structure of seasonally differenced quarterly earnings. As the fiscal year improves, estimates are 
revised and estimation errors from earlier quarters are incorporated in earnings, as they are realised. As an 
example, merchandising firms, which are permitted to use the gross profit method to estimate cost of goods sold, 
appear to apply an estimated gross profit margin to reported quarterly sales to conclude quarterly cost of goods 
sold in the first three fiscal quarters, at the same time as inventory levels are audited to find out annual cost of 
goods sold to provide year-end financial statements. Taxes provide a second example of interim expense 
allocation. Firms calculate quarterly tax expense by estimating the effective tax rate for the full fiscal year and 
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applying this rate to quarterly earnings, with the estimated effective tax rate than being updated.  
These inferences are not new. In a relatively early study, Newell (1969) states that, since year-end adjustments 
have a considerable effect on the previous interim period (the fourth quarter in the US), revenue and other 
expense in the provided net income should often be affected. Newell’s study demonstrates how interim data are 
exposed to many limitations, e.g. (a) how yearly fixed costs allocates to the interim periods; (b) how windfalls 
or miscellaneous revenues allocates to interim periods of; and (c) accounting for necessitated adjustments which 
are disclosed only at year-end. Moreover, as interim statements were then unaudited, Newell pointed out the 
opportunity for the company to provide financial reports that are not derived as an effect of principles acceptable 
to an independent public accountant, providing greater opportunities to ‘manage’ reported interim income than 
reported annual income.  
Recent research in the UK echoes these considerations. Mangena and Tauringana (2008) investigate the 
relationship between audit committees and the decision to engage external auditors to reassess the interim 
financial reports that has already published. They use interim reports of 258 UK listed companies, and find that 
engaging an external auditor to review interim financial reports increases with audit committee independence 
and financial proficiency, concluding that such decisions can improve the quality of interim financial reporting. 
4. Conclusions 
This study has described interim accounting reporting in the UK, including professional instructions to prepare 
the interim reports, and related accounting standards for interim reporting. Also presented is a discussion of the 
main purpose of interim reports, the methods of preparation, the benefits of reviewing the reports, and empirical 
research about them. This paper finding shows there are two main different arguments about frequent reporting. 
First, there is evidence that the establishment of mandatory quarterly reporting did not affect on the timeliness of 
actual earnings (see Butler et al, 2002). They argue that quarterly reporting replaced well-timed voluntary 
disclosures. Butler et al. (2002) believe that forcing managers to report earnings several time in the year, may 
push them to make unreasonable decisions. The second argument is that more frequent reporting may persuade 
additional information compilation activity by analysts and users. However, in spite of some of the conditions 
stated above, their analysis of price inconsistency in announcement periods gives counter-evidence that 
increasing in reporting frequency can make financial reports more valuable to investors and the other users.  
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Notes 
Note 1. The Transparency Directive (TD) was published in the Official Journal of the EU on 31 December 2004, 
and came into force as a Directive on 20 January 2005, with a 24-month implementation period. The TD was 
was implemented in the UK on 20 January 2007. 
Note 2. IAS 34 determines the minimum content for interim reports and the principles for detection in such 
reports; for more information see 
http://www.ifrs.org/NR/rdonlyres/2E15F246-850B-4717-987B-50C21C375EF5/0/IAS34.pdf 
Note 3. The relevant Financial Reporting Releases are: 46 FR 12489 (Feb 17, 1981), 50 FR 25215 (June 18, 
1985), 50 FR 49533 (Dec 3, 1985), 57 FR 45293 (Oct 1, 1992), 64 FR 73401 (Dec 30, 1999), 73 FR 956 (Jan 4, 
2008), 74 FR 18616 (Apr 23, 2009), 76 FR 50120 (Aug 12, 2011). 
Note 4. For fully-listed companies, the first set of consolidated accounts which had to be prepared under IFRS 
was for the first period that commenced on or after 1st January 2005, i.e. for companies with December year 
ends, the first IFRS accounts were for the year ended 31st December 2005. 
Note 5. In 2006, The International Financial Reporting Interpretations Committee (IFRIC)
 
published an 
Interpretation IFRIC 10 Interim Financial Reporting and Impairment. The statement shows the clear difference 
between the requirements of IAS 34 and those in other standards on the detection and reversal in interim financial 
reports of impairment possible losses on goodwill and convinced financial assets. IFRIC 10 illustrates that any 
such impairment losses distinguished in an interim report should not be reversed in following interim or annual 
financial reports. 
Note 6. The effective date of the latest (May 2010) amendment to IAS 34 is 1 January 2011. 
Note 7. Listed companies were required to issue their interim financial reports within three months of the 
period-end (before 20 January 2007). The accounting periods starting on or after 20th of January 2007, a 
semi-annually report must be issued within 60 days of the period end. 
Note 8. Appendix B to IAS (34) makes guidance for using the basic recognition and measurement principles to 
different types of asset, liability, income and expense. 
Note 9. Dargenidou C, Mcleay S and Raonic I (2001). argue that how the firm’s disclosure performance affect 
the mix of earnings information reproduced in its current period returns. They focus on explaining current 
period returns in terms of innovations about current activities and earnings expectations in future. According to 
their method, tthe related information is explained by the level of earnings in current and future period after 
controlling the anticipated level of earnings and future unexpected innovations (in terms of future returns). 
According to their research, stock returns of the i firm for year t is measured over the twelve-month period, 
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ending 90 days after the fiscal year end. 
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